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Physician-Patient Privilege In Ohio
Naoma Lee Stewart*
C ONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS between a physician and his
patient were not privileged against disclosure at common
law. Outside a court of law the doctor's tongue was curbed by
the strict ethical demands of his profession and his conscience;'
but if summoned to court as a witness he could and had to disclose
any information he received while attending or treating his pa-
tient, regardless of any detrimental effect such disclosure might
have on either the patient or physician. This common law rule
was based on the theory that the need for the disclosure of the
whole truth was so essential for the proper administration of
justice that it outweighed any consideration of professional con-
fidence.2
In 1828, New York was the first state to depart from the
common law rule by passing a statute which forbade a phy-
sician to disclose any information acquired in attending a patient
in a professional character which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe for such patient.3 Since that time this legislative
privilege has been enacted in varying forms in nearly two-thirds
* A.B., Western Mich. College of Ed. & Lib. Arts; a Senior at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Pledging himself that never would he voluntarily divulge the medical
confidences of his patients, Hippocrates vowed, "Whatsoever things I see or
hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart
therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon,
counting such things to be as sacred secrets." For complete Oath, see Foxe,
The Oath of Hippocrates, 19 Psychiatric Q. 17 (1945). See DeWitt, Medical
Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances, 5 West. Res.
L. Rev. 5 (1953).
2 "At common law no privilege existed as to communications between
physician and patient. . . The public interest in the disclosure of all facts
relevant to a litigated issue was deemed to be superior to the policy of
recognizing, for the benefit of the patient, the inviolability of confidential
communications." State v. Martin. 182 N. C. 846, 109 S. E. 74 (1921).
3 Some statements of Buller, J., in 1792 in a case involving the application
of the attorney-client privilege seem to have furnished the inspiration for
the pioneer New York statute of 1828. He said: "The privilege is confined
to the cases of counsel, solicitor, and attorney. . . It is indeed hard in many
cases to compel a friend to disclose a confidential conversation; and I
should be glad if by law such evidence could be excluded. It is a subject
of just indignation where persons are anxious to reveal what has been
communicated to them in a confidential manner. .. There are cases to which
it is much to be lamented that the law of privilege is not extended; those
in which medical persons are obliged to disclose the information which
they acquire by attending in their professional characteristics." Wilson v.
Rastall, 4 Term Rep. 753, 759, 100 Eng. Rep. 1287 (K. B. 1792).
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of the states.4 Seventeen states still seem to follow England in
preserving the common law rule that there is no legal check
on the revelations of medical secrets.5
Throughout its history the physician-patient privilege has
been the subject of controversial discussion, and in recent years
these discussions have been dominated by voices of bitter dis-
approval and severe criticism. Judges, lawyers, textwriters, and
teachers have denounced the privilege by characterizing it as
everything from a "monumental hoax" to a "clever legerdemain
loaned by the law to the parties to suppress the truth." 6 Critics
maintain that in the majority of reported cases the patient in-
voked the privilege, not to protect his privacy or to prevent the
disclosure of humiliating personal facts7 (supposedly the pur-
pose for the creation of the privilege), but to exclude relevant
and material evidence which would reduce or defeat a verdict
favorable to the patient.'
It is estimated that ninety percent of the litigation in which
the privilege is invoked consists of actions on life, accident or
health insurance policies, actions for personal injury9 or wrong-
ful death, or testamentary actions where the mental capacity of
the testator is the principal issue. In all of these cases, the
4 These statutes are compiled and quoted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380,
note 5 (3rd, 1940).
5 These are listed in Chafee, Is Justice Served by Closing the Doctor's
Mouth, 52 Yale L. J., 607 (1943).
6 There is a wealth of excellent discussion, all adverse, on the policy of the
privilege. The best and severest criticism is contained in 8 Wigmore, supra,
note 4. Other references: Chafee, supra note 5; Freedman, Medical Privilege,
32 Can. B. R. 1 (1954); Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 Columbia L. R.
388 (1906); Welch, Another Anomaly-The Patient's Privilege, 13 Miss. L. J.
137 (1941); Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4
Ark. L. R. (1950); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert
Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. Chi. L. R. 285, 290 (1943).
7 "From asthma to broken ribs, from ague to tetanus, the facts of the disease
are not only disclosable without shame, but are in fact often known and
knowable by everyone-except the appointed investigators of truth." See 8
Wigmore, supra, note 4.
8 "What is there indelicate or of a nature to humiliate a patient claiming
damages for defective vision or a broken leg, or any other injury displayed
in evidence, in proving that the condition attributed to a recent accident
was of long standing? Such a disclosure might show that the litigation was
dishonest; but the physician's testimony . . . would not be in itself humiliat-
ing or disgraceful, or reveal any secret except that the injury exhibited as
new was in fact old." Purrington, A Recent Case of Patient's Privilege, 9
Bench and Bar 48, 52 (1907). And see note 9, infra.
9 "Instead of accomplishing the purpose for which it was originally in-
tended, the privilege has been so far corrupted today that it is used, at
least in personal injury cases, for the most part for suppression of the
truth." Nelson v. Ackermann, 83 N. W. 2d 500, 506 (Minn. 1957). And see
note 8, supra.
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testimony of the physician who attended the patient would be
the best and most reliable evidence, but such testimony may be
excluded at the whim of the patient who acts as his own judge
in determining whether such evidence shall be admissible. In
other words the statutes permit the holder of the privilege to
use the testimony of his physician if the evidence will strengthen
his case and to exclude it when offered by his opponent if it
weakens his case. The monstrous injustice of such a situation
is obvious.10 Of course, if the patient voluntarily testifies as to
part of the privileged matter, he may be questioned as to all of it.
The mounting waves of protest and criticism have not been
without effect. The legislatures which created the original
privilege are each day amending and cancelling out the intended
benefits of the statutes. Some authorities suggest that it is
high time to abolish completely the physician-patient privilege,'
but they also admit that this may not be possible within a reason-
able length of time. As long as the privilege is allowed to exist
a complete understanding of those statutes which control the
introduction of evidence is essential. Although the basic policy
of modern statutes creating the privilege is the same, there is
a wide disparity in their contents and limitations, and each must
be analyzed separately.
In Ohio, both the physician-patient and the attorney-client
privilege are set forth in the same statute.12 It provides that the
attorney and physician may not testify concerning any com-
munications by or advice to the client or patient in their pro-
fessional relationship except: (1) by express consent of the
client or patient; (2) by express consent of the deceased client's
10 "The whole proceeding, in the opinion of the writer, to say the least,
was a perversion of justice, if not an absolute travesty. It was anything
but even-handed justice. It was not a square deal, and . . . it was using as
a sword against his adversary the privilege which was intended for his own
protection. If this is the meaning and extent of the statute under which the
privilege is claimed, the sooner the statute is repealed, the better it will
be for the administration of justice." Dahiquist v. Denver & Rio G. R. R.,
52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833 (1918).
11 De Witt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 39
(1958); and see note 6, supra.
12 "The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: (A) An
attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his client in that
relation or his advice to his client; or a physician, concerning a communica-
tion made to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his patient;
but the attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or
patient, or if the client or patient be deceased, by the express consent of
the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the estate of such
deceased client or patient; and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies,
the attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject."
Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (Baldwin Cum. Issue 1956).
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or patient's surviving spouse, executor, or administrator; (3)
by the client or patient voluntarily testifying, and then the
attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same
subject.
By combining the two privileges confusion is immediately
invited because of the two different interpretations of construc-
tion which must be placed upon the one statute. Following the
general rule of statutory construction, the physician-patient
privilege which is in derogation of the common law should be
strictly construed, while an opposite liberal construction would
be given the attorney-client privilege which existed at common
law.13 Although the rule itself is uncomplicated, conflicts arise
from the different attitudes of the courts towards the basic wis-
dom of the physician-patient privilege. A sympathetic court
14
would tend to condone a more liberal construction of the priv-
ilege than a court which is apprehensive of the privilege's power
to exclude evidence essential to the administration of justice.
As a result of this conflict, in Ohio, we have decisions affecting
the physician-patient and attorney-client privilege which are
impossible to reconcile. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court
decisions on the two privileges in Harpman v. Devine and Spitzer
v. Stillings (both cases are discussed below) give the term "on
the subject" a more liberal construction for the physician-patient
privilege, which is in derogation of the common law and would
normally require a strict statutory construction, than the in-
terpretation given to the companion attorney-client privilege. 15
13 In Ohio the effect of the waiver clause on the physician-patient privilege
is given in the severely criticized Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10
N. E. 2d 776 (1937). An opposite interpretation of the effect of the same
clause on the attorney-client privilege appears in Spitzer v. Stillings, 109
Ohio St. 297, 142 N. E. 365 (1924).
14 Note, 51 Harv. L. R. 931 (1938) in discussing Harpman v. Devine, supra
note 13, said, "The decision reflects a surprising judicial sympathy toward
the much criticized physician-patient privilege. The offered testimony of
Dr. F. might well have been held to be 'on the same subject' as the plain-
tiff's testimony concerning his antecedent physical condition."
15 The convincing dissenting opinion by Zimmerman in Harpman v. De-
vine, supra note 13, at J., concurred in by Weygandt, Ch. J., states: "The
meaning of the phrase 'on the same subject' was definitely settled in Spitzer
v. Stillings, Exr., 109 Ohio St. 297, 142 N. E. 365, 366 (1924). That case plainly
holds such phrase refers to the subject of the controversy . . . and cannot
be limited or restricted merely to the subject of the communications be-
tween client and attorney or patient and physician... The majority opinion
(of Harpman v. Devine) therefore broadens the shield of Section 11494,
General Code, to an unwarranted extent, and gives the phrase 'on the
same subject' as used in that section, an interpretation which was ex-
pressly disapproved in Spitzer v. Stillings, supra." Harpman v. Devine, 133
Ohio St. 1, 10 N. E. 2d 776 (1937).
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To add to the confusion, in 1958 a unanimous Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals decision (the Roberto case)16 broad-
ened extensively the meaning of the words "on the subject," at
least as to testimony by deposition where the physician-patient
privilege is applicable. With a subtle judicial snub of Ohio's
leading case on the physician-patient privilege, the court com-
pletely ignored the severely criticized Harpman v. Devine, (dis-
cussed below), and solved its problem as to the extent that the
patient waives the physician-patient privilege by applying the
reasoning followed in Ohio's leading case on the attorney-client
privilege. These and other problems make a brief analysis of
the Ohio law on the physician-patient privilege pertinent.
The Privilege-in General
Statutes making communications between physician and
patient privileged are usually considered to refer to those whose
business comes within the definition of "physician" 17 and who
are duly authorized to pursue the practice of medicine and law-
fully engage in that vocation. Practically all courts agree that
the statutes afford protection only to those relationships spe-
cifically named therein. Some states, such as those of New York,
include a dentist and nurse, but in Ohio since only the word
"physician" is used, no privilege is extended to communications
between a patient and his nurse.1 8 However, if the nurse is the
private nurse and agent of the physician and she obtains her
knowledge through this relationship, she may not disclose infor-
mation thus acquired. 19
A licensed optometrist has been held to be a physician
within the meaning of the statutory privilege. 20 Whether an
osteopath can be included within the scope of the privilege is
unsettled. Early statutes licensing osteopaths usually limited
16 In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151 N. E. 2d 37 (1958). For further
discussion of this case see the section on Waiver and note 60, infra.
17 Ohio Rev. Code, § 4731.34. "Physician" is defined in the section on licens-
ing, not the section on privilege.
18 The statute must be strictly construed; and since the relationship of
nurse and patient is not specifically named in the statute, no privilege is
extended to communications between a patient and his nurse. Weis v. Weis,
147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245 (1947).
19 Humble v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 28 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 481, aff'd.
31 N. E. 2d 887, Rehear. denied 32 N. E. 2d 425 (1931).
20 State v. Viola, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 82 N. E. 2d 306, app. dism. 148 Ohio
St. 712, 76 N. E. 2d 715, cert. denied 334 U. S. 816, 68 Sup. Ct. 1070 (1947).
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their professional activities. More recent statutes are very
broad in most states, and now an osteopath appears to be en-
titled to practice in most of the fields of medicine and surgery.
One writer suggests that there seems to be no valid reason
why they should not be considered as "physicians" within the
meaning and intent of the physician-patient privilege statutes.
21
It is generally held that treatment of a sick person by a Christian
Science practitioner is not the practice of medicine, and the
Ohio statute defining "physician" expressly exempts a Christian
Science practitioner from the operation of statutes relating to
the practice of medicine. 2
2
The privilege belongs to the patient and not to the physician,
who cannot invoke it for his own benefit.23 Its purpose is to
protect the patient and not the physician from the consequences
of disclosure. The statute creating the privilege is not a rule of
substantive law; it merely prescribes a rule of evidence which
is applicable in any form or action. 24 The physician is not pro-
hibited from revealing confidential information to anyone by
virtue of the statute; it merely prohibits a physician from intro-
ducing such information into evidence in a proceeding where he
is a witness under oath. The word "testify" in the statute does
not limit the applicability of the privilege to the trial in court,
but also includes testimony by deposition. 25 In Ohio, although
the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that hearings con-
ducted by the commission shall not be bound by the common
law or statutory rules of evidence, it has been held that an
applicant for compensation cannot be required to waive his
rights under the privilege statute as a condition precedent to a
consideration for his claim.20
Supposedly, the purpose of this legislative privilege was to
encourage and preserve confidences. It would seem to follow
logically that to render a communication between a physician
and patient privileged it must have been confidential. Ohio does
21 DeWitt, supra note 11, at 86.
22 Supra, note 17.
23 State v. Osborne, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 543, 15 N. E. 2d 175 (1937).
24 John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jennings, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 583,
(1934).
25 In re Loewenthal, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N. E. 2d 158 (1956). Query
whether the confidante of the physician could testify? Or is it hearsay? Or
does the privilege prevent testimony for impeachment purposes?
26 State ex rel. Galloway v. Industrial Comm., 134 Ohio St. 496, 17 N. E.
2d 918 (1938).
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not require confidentiality. The privilege attaches notwithstand-
ing the presence of such third persons as interpreters, but if
such person is not necessary to enable the communication be-
tween the patient and physician, then such third person may
testify.2 7 Presence of a third person not required as a mere
"transmitter" is publication.
Relationship of Physician and Patient Necessary
In order that a person's communication to a physician may
be privileged, there must exist between them the relation of
physician and patient, which of course, arises through contract,
express or implied. The consent of the patient to the relation-
ship may be implied, as when he is brought to the physician in
a semiconscious condition. It is immaterial by whom such phy-
sician is employed. The fact that the physician is the employee
of a third person does not exempt the resulting relationship
from the privileged category even when the third party is the
patient's employer.
28
As a general rule, the relationship of physician and patient
does not exist unless curative treatment is contemplated. Thus,
no relationship was created by an examination of decedent by a
physician engaged by decedent's employer where such examina-
tion did not include treatment nor advice, and clearly was not
for the purpose of alleviating decedent's pain nor curing his
malady.29
Generally speaking, staff physicians and other physicians in
the employ of a public or private hospital enter into the relation-
ship of physician and patient with every person who enters the
hospital for the purpose of care and treatment. In Ohio there is
substantial conflict as to whether or not this relationship is
created. A 1937 case held the testimony of an interne of a
public hospital inadmissible because the relationship was estab-
lished when the interne made a routine examination and took
the case history of the patient on her admission to the hospital.30
However, a later case held that a physician employed by a
27 Ryan v. Industrial Comm., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 72 N. E. 2d 907 (1946).
28 Malone v. Industrial Comm., 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N. E. 2d 266 (1942).
29 Suetta v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 75 Ohio L. Abs. 487, 144 N. E. 2d
292 (1955).
30 Lamarand v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 58 Ohio App. 415, 16 N. E. 2d
701 (1937).
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public hospital could testify, since the patient's contractual re-
lationship was with the hospital and not with its physician."'
This same distinction had been made in earlier cases.
3 2
The relation of physician and patient does not exist when a
physician is requested by the plaintiff's attorney to examine his
client for the sole purpose of aiding the attorney in his prepara-
tion of a lawsuit.33 Nor does the relationship exist where an
employer sends an employee to its physician, not to treat or cure
him, but for the single purpose of enabling the employer to
intelligently decide whether it can safely and properly continue
him as one of its employees.3
4
If a party in a civil action is required to submit to a physical
examination by a physician selected by his adversary or ap-
pointed by the court, the relationship of physician and patient
does not exist and the physician may testify to any information
he gained during the course of the examination.35 The same rule
would apply to a criminal action. Where a physical examination
of the accused is made without his objection for the purpose of
proving or disproving his guilt of the crime charged, the relation-
ship is non-existent and the results of the examination may be
introduced at the trial.36
Generally, a physician performing an autopsy is not pre-
cluded from testifying if he never attended or treated the de-
ceased prior to death, since the required relationship did not
exist." There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the privilege
31 Lumpkin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Ohio App. 310, 63 N. E. 2d
189, aff'd. 146 Ohio St. 25, 64 N. E. 2d 63 (1945).
32 No relation existed between patient and hospital's pathologist; Nelson v.
Western & Southern Ins. Co., 23 Ohio L. Abs. 117 (1936); no relation existed
where injured employee was treated by defendant's physician in its own
hospital, Dewert v. Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 268
(1933); No relation exists between patient in a municipal tuberculosis
hospital and a physician employed by it, Wills, Adm'r. v. National Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 28 Ohio App. 497, 162 N. E. 822 (1928).
33 McMillen v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ohio L. Abs. 435, 37 N. E. 2d 632
(1941).
34 New York Central R. R. v. Wiler, 124 Ohio St. 118, 177 N. E. 205 (1931).
35 State ex rel. Galloway v. Industrial Comm., supra, note 26; Suetta v. Car-
negie-Ilinois Steel Corp., supra, note 29.
36 The question of privilege was not raised, Angeloff v. State, 91 Ohio St.
361, 110 N. E. 936 (1914).
37 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F. 2d 680, cert. denied 278 U. S. 638,
58 A. L. R. 1127 (1928); Cross v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 228 Iowa 800,
293 N. W. 464 (1940).
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applies when the physician performing the autopsy also was the
attending physician during the lifetime of the deceased.38 Ohio
has no decision on this problem.
Subject Matter of Communication
The privilege statute protects the communications and ad-
vice of the physician. Early Ohio cases held that the only com-
munications that would be protected were the verbal communi-
cations of doctor and patient.39 This view was later discarded,
and it is now held that privileged communications between phy-
sician and patient may be made by exhibition of the body to the
physician for examination or treatment as well as by oral or
written communications between the physician and patient.
40
There are a variety of facts to which the physician may
properly testify without violating the patient's right to privacy.
For instance, the physician may testify to the fact of his employ-
ment by and treatment of the patient; 4' the number and dates of
his visits; the dates of the patient's entry and departure from a
hospital; and that he recommended the taking of x-ray photo-
graphs and performed an operation on the patient.42
Ohio courts have held that where the only purpose of the
physician's professional attendance was for treatment of a physi-
cal ailment, the physician is competent to testify as to the pa-
tient's mental condition as he observed it during the course of
his professional employment. 43
The privilege does not include communications not within
the professional relation, such as advice on financial matters44 nor
38 "As to evidence obtained from an autopsy, we have no hesitancy in say-
ing that such is not privileged, when not dependent upon, and when capable
of being by the physician segregated from, information which he received
as an attending physician." Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993(1928).
39 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v. Howie, 68 Ohio St. 614, 68 N. E. 4 (1903).
40 In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151 N. E. 2d 37 (1958); Ausdenmoore
v. Holzback, 89 Ohio. St. 381, 106 N. E. 41 (1914); Baker v. Industrial
Comm., 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N. E. 2d 593 (1939).
41 Sambles v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 233, 108 N. E. 2d 321
(1952); Willig v. Prudential Ins. Co., 71 Ohio App. 255, 49 N. E. 2d 421
(1942); Russell v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N. E.
2d 251 (1941).
42 Willig v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, note 41.
43 Carson v. Beatley, 86 Ohio App. 173, 82 N. E. 2d 745 (1948); Meier v.
Peirano, 76 Ohio App. 9, 62 N. E. 2d 920 (1945); Olney v. Schurr, 21 Ohio
L. Abs. 630, app. dism. 131 Ohio St. 398, 3 N. E. 2d 43 (1936); Heisehnann
v. Franks, 48 Ohio App. 536, 194 N. E. 604 (1934).
44 In re Estate of Chase, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 111 (1940).
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an admission by the patient that he was negligent.45 Information
as to illegal acts such as the commission of a crime is not priv-
ileged and an ordinance requiring a physician to report gunshot
wounds does not violate the privilege.
4
Waiver
Prior to a 1953 amendment to the Ohio statute the privilege
could be waived only in two ways; by the express waiver of the
patient, or by the patient voluntarily testifying. The amended
statute liberalized the right of waiver by providing that after the
death of the patient the privilege could be waived by the sur-
viving spouse, executor, or administrator. 47 Prior to this re-
vision, Ohio courts had consistently held that the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased patient could not waive the privilege
to permit the attending physician to testify.48 Before the statute
was amended, a widow could waive the privilege of her deceased
husband only in an action brought under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law.49
Ohio has held that the beneficiary of an insurance policy
cannot waive the privilege. 50 The recent amendment would not
seem to change the rule unless the beneficiary happened to be
the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the
estate of the deceased insured; then, of course, he would be per-
mitted to waive the privilege.
Another method of waiver is by the patient renouncing and
abandoning the protection the statute would otherwise provide
for him.51 The express waiver of the patient is not essential; it
may be implied from his conduct and acts. For example, where
an attending physician is requested by his patient, the testator,
45 Dewart v. Cincinnati Milling Machine Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 268 (1933).
46 Bolton v. City of Cleveland, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 599 (1924).
47 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (Baldwin Cum. Issue 1956). See supra, note 12.
48 McKee v. New Idea, Inc., 36 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 44 N. E. 2d 697 (1942);
Colwell v. Dwyer, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 455, 35 N. E. 2d 789 (1940); Parisky v.
Pierstorff, 63 Ohio App. 503, 27 N. E. 2d 254 (1939). The same rule applies
to the attorney-client privilege, Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 130
N. E. 22 (1920).
49 Industrial Comm. v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N. E. 2d 248 (1936).
50 Russell v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N. E. 2d 251
(1941); Thompson v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 68 Ohio App. 439, 37
N. E. 2d 621 (1941).
51 Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N. E. 2d 776 (1937); Industrial
Comm. v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N. E. 2d 248 (1936); Ausdenmoore v.
Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 106 N. E. 41 (1914).
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to witness his will and does subscribe to the will as a witness,
the patient thereby waives the restrictions on the competency
of the physician and consents to the physician being called as a
witness by either side to be examined and cross-examined in an
action involving the validity of the will.52 Ohio, with the ma-
jority of states, also recognizes that the waiver of the privilege
by an applicant for an insurance policy, either in the application
or in the policy itself, is valid and does not violate public
policy.53 Of course, in these situations none of them are for treat-
ment, and so the doctor could testify anyway.
The third method of waiving the privilege has created con-
flicting and inconsistent decisions in Ohio. The statute provides
that if the patient voluntarily testifies, the physician may be
compelled to testify on the same subject. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the words "on the same subject" to mean the
subject matter of the communication between the physician and
patient, but when applied to the attorney-client privilege the
same words mean the subject matter of the controversy. 4 With
their decision in Harpman v. Devine and Spitzer v. Stillings,
the Court has succeeded in liberally construing the physician-
patient privilege which would normally require a strict con-
struction, and strictly construing the attorney-client privilege
which would normally require a liberal construction.
In Harpman v. Devine, a personal injury action, the plain-
tiff testified on direct examination that prior to the accident his
health had been good, but following the accident he suffered
from a variety of ailments; however he made no reference to any
communications or treatment between himself and his physician.
The defendant contended that plaintiff's complaints were the
usual consequences of pernicious anemia and offered the testi-
mony of a Dr. F. who had treated the plaintiff for pernicious
anemia to prove this contention. The plaintiff objected to the
doctor's testimony on the grounds of privilege. The objection
was sustained and the testimony of Dr. F. was held inadmissible.
The Supreme Court held that testimony by the patient on
direct examination that his general physical condition was good
before an accident, without any mention of treatment by or com-
munication to or from the physician was not a waiver of the
52 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245 (1947).
53 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N. E. 176 (1927).
54 See supra note 15.
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privilege without the express consent of the patient. 55 On cross
examination, the plaintiff admitted receiving treatment prior to
his injury. The court further held that merely answering ques-
tions as to treatment from a physician in response to questions
on cross-examination was not voluntary testimony within the
meaning of the statute and did not waive the privilege.5"
By contrast, in Spitzer v. Stillings, the Supreme Court held
the privilege waived in the attorney-client relationship when the
client voluntarily testified as a witness in his own behalf, al-
though the client made no reference in his testimony to any
communication with the attorney. The court held that any at-
torney to whom the client had made communications profession-
ally may be compelled to testify with reference to the subject
concerning which the client has testified. If the client testifies he
may be cross-examined concerning communications with an
attorney, in that relation, on any subject pertinent to his case
testified by him in chief. The court said, "If the Legislature
meant the word 'subject' to be confined to the subject of the com-
munication between the client and attorney, it could easily have
so stated, and in the absence of that limitation, it is more probable
that it was intended to include the subject matter of his testimony
generally." 57
Had the Supreme Court in Harpman followed the holding
of the earlier Spitzer case, it would have been obliged to hold
that, by the patient voluntarily testifying as to his previous state
of health he had waived the privilege; then the testimony of Dr.
F. on the subject matter of plaintiff's general testimony would
55 "Defendant maintains that when plaintiff, in his direct examination which
was voluntary, testified that his health before the time of the accident was
good, he thereby testified on a 'subject' under the statute in such a man-
ner as to permit the defendant to introduce testimony respecting his health
during that period, including the communications, advice and treatment of
plaintiff by Dr. F. It is asserted that when plaintiff testified that his health
was good he thereby 'opened the door' and waived the privilege accorded
him by statute. It is claimed that health is a subject that is not only a gen-
eral term but necessarily includes communications and advice especially
in the case at bar. While there is much force in such an argument, such
an interpretation would render the statute useless and ineffective in every
case where the plaintiff or patient has testified generally respecting his
health." Harpman v. Devine, 135 Ohio St. 6, 10 N. E. 2d 776 (1937).
56 It is well-established that testimony elicited by cross-examination of a
patient as to privileged communications or information is not voluntary and
therefore does not constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege.
Gilpin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 566, 132 S. W. 2d 686 (1939);
Vilardi v. Vilardi, 200 Misc. 1043, 107 N. Y. S. 163 (1951); Baker v. Industrial
Comm., 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N. E. 2d 593 (1939).
57 Spitzer v. Stillings, Exr., 109 Ohio St. 297, 142 N. E. 365 (1924).
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have been admissible. The majority opinion maintained in a
single sentence that the two cases were distinguishable; but no
attempt whatsoever was made to distinguish them. The end
result of Harpman was to allow a plaintiff in a personal injury
action to falsely testify that prior to an accident his health had
been good when in truth he had suffered from pernicious
anemia; and then by invoking the privilege the former attending
physician was prevented from testifying to the existence of the
pernicious anemia, which plaintiff's own physician-witness con-
ceded on recross-examination could have caused every ailment
and symptom of which the plaintiff complained.58
The obviously unjust result of this decision typfies the
cases which have provoked a series of vehement and scathing
denunciations of the physician-patient privilege. The vigorous
and reasonable dissent in Harpman logically concluded that "....
when a patient voluntarily divulges his corporeal afflictions on
the witness stand in open court to serve his own pecuniary ends,
any good or sufficient reason for maintaining the silence of the
physician who has attended him no longer obtains." 59
There are indications that the time is ripe in Ohio to over-
rule the Supreme Court holding in Harpman. In December of
1958, the Cuyahoga Court of Appeals broadened the meaning of
the words "on the same subject" even beyond the interpretation
given them by the Supreme Court in Spitzer. In a personal injury
and negligence case against the Ohio Bell Telephone Company
which is still pending, the plaintiff testified voluntarily as to her
condition and treatment generally by deposition to perpetuate
her testimony. When the defendants attempted to question her
physician in a deposition hearing, the doctor refused to answer
the questions on the ground of privilege. He was placed under
technical arrest for contempt of a notary public because of his
refusal to answer.
The court ruled that not only must the physician answer
questions relating to the patient's condition and treatment to
58 "The application of the rule [Harpman v. Devine] adopted by the court
will tend to bring the administration of the law into disrepute, and will
support the charge that the law often fails to serve the ends of justice."
William L. Hart (later a member of the Ohio Supreme Court), Review of
Ohio Case Law for 1937, 10 Ohio Op. 164, 176 (1938).
59 The dissent also quoted Wigmore saying, "Certainly it is a spectacle to
increase the layman's traditional contempt for the chicanery of the law,
when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a crowded court room
the details of his supposed ailment and then neatly suppresses the available
proof of his falsities by wielding a weapon nominally termed privilege."
Harpman v. Devine, supra note 55.
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which she had voluntarily testified in her deposition; but the phy-
sician could also be required to answer inquiries relating to his
findings and diagnosis, regardless of whether or not the patient
had knowledge of such findings and diagnosis. 0 In other words,
the Court of Appeals evidently has held that the patient waived
the privilege not only as to the subjects on which she voluntarily
testified but also as to the diagnosis and findings of which she
may have had no knowledge. At first consideration, it is difficult
to conceive how it is possible for a person to waive something of
which he had no knowledge. However, the court may have
reasoned that physicians frequently have knowledge of facts
which for the patient's own good they do not reveal to them, but
such facts could be extremely pertinent and material in a legal
action for personal injuries.
In arriving at its conclusions, the court never mentioned
Harpman. This silent snub can scarcely be interpreted as any-
thing except an unexpressed judicial disapproval of that criticized
decision. It seems safe to conclude that the Cuyahoga Court of
Appeals is sympathetic toward the principles enunciated in the
dissenting opinion; namely, that once a person voluntarily puts
his physical condition in issue to serve his own pecuniary ends,
in the interest of justice there no longer exists any reason for
silencing the attending physician. The decision indicates a tend-
ency of the court to swing back to the strict statutory construc-
tion which originally should have been placed on the physician-
patient privilege.6 1
Had the court arrived at a different conclusion, it would
have been a perfect opportunity for the defense to appeal and
attempt to overrule part of Harpman. In the twenty-two years
since that decision, changes in the membership of the Supreme
Court, plus an uninterrupted flow of criticism on the case, have
indicated that this accomplishment is probably just a matter of
time and opportunity. In view of these facts, attorneys for the
60 A person who voluntarily testifies, by deposition, as to his condition and
treatment generally but does not testify as to his physician's finding upon
examination and the diagnosis of his condition, waives the physician-patient
privilege attached thereto, whether such findings and diagnosis are within
such person's knowledge or not, and such physician can be required to
answer inquiries relating thereto. In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151
N. E. 2d 37 (1958).
61 The majority of courts now hold that, since the statute is in derogation
of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio
St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245 (1947); Carson v. Beatley, 86 Ohio App. 173, 82 N. E.
2d 745. (1948); Meier v. Peirano, 76 Ohio App. 9, 62 N. E. 2d 920 (1945).
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plaintiff would undoubtedly be hesitant to risk an appeal for fear
of getting a Supreme Court ruling which might be even more
to their disadvantage.
With little possibility of an immediate Supreme Court de-
cision on the subject, many things are still left unsettled by the
1958 Roberto case.6 2 Whether that ruling applies only to testi-
mony by deposition is undecided. In a 1956 decision by the same
Court of Appeals, the opinion emphasized that their ruling ap-
plied to testimony by deposition and not testimony at the trial. 3
This distinction was not made in the Roberto case. There would
seem to be no logical reason for having two separate rules of
law on the physician-patient privilege; one for testimony by
deposition and one for testimony at the trial. Perhaps the court
meant that if the plaintiff who perpetuated her testimony by
deposition did not use the deposition, but appeared personally
at the trial, the extent of the waiver would be determined by
the testimony at the trial and not the testimony in the deposition.
Until some of these problems are clarified by further ju-
dicial decisions, Ohio's position regarding to what extent the
patient waives the physician-patient privilege remains unsettled
and subject to varying interpretations within the state. It is to
be hoped that some of these problems will be solved, either by
amendment to the statute or decisive judicial decisions, in the
very near future.
62 Supra, notes 16, 40, 62.
63 In re Loewenthal, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N. E. 2d 158 (1956). Plaintiff,
in a personal injury action, for the purpose of perpetuating his testimony,
gave his deposition on direct examination. Thereafter, defendant subpoenaed
the petitioner, who was plaintiff's physician, for the purpose of questioning
him by way of deposition regarding plaintiff's injuries. On objection by
plaintiff's counsel, the petitioner refused to testify and was held in con-
tempt. On appeal it was held that plaintiff by testifying in his own behalf
had waived the privilege and therefore the physician must testify by way
of deposition. The physician had refused to answer any questions. The
issue was whether or not the physician could be compelled to testify by
way of deposition in a case where the patient had voluntarily testified by
deposition solely for her own benefit and for the purpose of perpetuating
her own testimony. The court limited its decision to the precise question
involved and did not decide what effect such waiver might have on the
trial proceedings.
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